A moral panic is a powerful state into which a society can be thrown. This happening has far reach consequences; influencing the social norms that guide everyday behavior, and sometimes bringing about change in legislature that affects us all. Stanley Cohen characterized this state as a reactionary approach to an issue that grips the public’s interests and, in short, abuses the public’s faith in the media( Cohen, 1972).
The term was coined by Cohen in the face of an overwhelmingly typical example of public overreaction that stemmed from the English seaside in the mid 1960’s. This particular moral panic was sparked by a single event that was perceived as indicative of a larger problem, namely the aggressive behavior prevalent in youth culture at the time. Cohen first used the term “Community Sensitization” (1967) to explain a phenomenon that ensued after a fight erupted in a small town in England. That term, a predecessor of Moral Panic, was used to explain the heightened awareness that a community possesses after such events. Arrests are made, a type of offender is identified, and suddenly everyone who exemplifies that type is a focal point for the nation’s issues. Cohen made note of an aggressive cycle in which law enforcement would become more aware of the types of crime that these groups were “apt” to commit after an exceptional case, and thus become more fervent in their efforts to enforce law on said group. This would lead those who were resistant to become agitated, an altercation to break-out, an arrest to be made, and thus more focus being placed on the group and more awareness of their “type” of behavior.
Who is to be blamed for these sorts of moral panics and community sensitization? Cohen identified five groups called the “actors” in his theory(1972). The first actor is the Press who contribute by exaggerating a story and misinforming the public of the facts. An event is publicized with scandalizing details, which in some cases are nothing but rumors, repeated until they become common knowledge; the offenders are stripped of individuality and become a stereotyped, blank face only identifiable by his style of dress and bad attitude, but always prone to commit crime. Often the press will report crimes in a way that distorts the facts but doesn’t change them; in this particular incident one newspaper reported that the windows in “all the dance halls in town” had been broken. While this fact was true, the paper neglected to mention that the town only contained one dance hall. Such exaggerated language is one of the primary reasons that issues are taken to be more serious than they are in reality.
The press, however, would not publish a story if no one was going to read it; so Cohen referred to the public as the second group of actors in moral panic. The public’s interest, piqued by stories of violence and more willing to demonize a stranger than to concern themselves with other issues, latch on to stories such as these. The press is a business and to remain in that business it is compelled to report on those things which the public will find interesting, thus investigative reporters drum up more “evidence” and “Facts” to publish and the cycle begins again. The press reports, the public pays attention and buys their paper, so the press finds similar stories to report, in turn drawing more and more focus to an issue that may not have actually gotten any larger. This effect of magnifying an issue will bring more public attention and outcry to pressure the next group of actors.
The third group of actors, according to Cohen’s work, is the law enforcement group. This group experiences pressure from higher-ups and the common people to “do something” about what is, in their eyes, a growing concern. In this situation law enforcement officials are “re-educated” to combat a specific issue and undergo a series of effects that change the way they operate. The process of “Diffusion” in which the bonds between officials and different groups of officials are knit more tightly helps to create a unified front against the issue which inspired the moral panic. Methods of coping with the issue are shared between groups and members of those groups, and the most effective strategies are formed, sometimes leading to what is called “escalation” by Cohen, in which methods of dealing with the problem become increasingly severe as a quick and effective strategy is brainstormed. This escalation often leads to vicious consequences for perpetrators of minor infractions, and the overall level of civil liberties being reduced. Behaviors once dismissed as mischievous are perceived as criminal in these circumstances, and this is all in the name of pleasing their higher-ups, the fourth group of actors.
The lawmakers and politicians who call to the law enforcement group, alongside the public, misled by the press, are the fourth group of actors in the moral panic. They are characterized by the same overreactions as the public but by the people who have the means to change the way in which the issue is approached. These moral panics are most damaging when focused upon by lawmakers, as they reroute their normal business to deal with an issue that only appears to be larger than it was before they had considered it worth mentioning. In the example which led Cohen to construct his theory of Moral panic, British lawmakers proposed antiquated methods of “fixing” their “rampant” problem of youth violence. Discussions of harsh punishment filled parliament with provocation from an outraged public, incensed by the press who grossly exaggerated the issue. This group is by far the most influential of the actors as they are the top of the chain that leads down to the actual “solution” on the streets. That solution, however, is not always perceived as adequate, leading from the most influential to the most dangerous of the actor groups.
The final group involved in a moral panic is what is referred to by Cohen as “action groups” but what I term more accurately as “reaction groups.” These are the most outspoken subset of the public who find the solutions proposed by lawmakers and the remedies enacted by law enforcement to be insufficient. Two such action groups existed in England during the backlash from the seaside incident; one in favor of mandatory punishment via work camps, the other resorting to the archaic punishment by birch rod, both entirely fueled by a misplaced fear and hatred for a group of dangerously maladjusted youths that didn’t even exist. These “Moral entrepreneurs” (Becker, 1963) are covered by the press and thus help to perpetuate their own fears and throw the entire public into what is called a “warning phase” by Cohen.
Cohen’s warning phase is part of his disaster theory stating that, in a moral panic, the public enters the same state it does during an actual panic that could be sparked by weather disasters. This is characterized by the sensitization previously mentioned, the overreactions previously mentioned, and the speculation which is often employed by action groups to sway the public to support their outlandish and overzealous punitive measures.
Moral panic is a dangerous and possibly destructive state which alters a society’s values, laws, and the fabric of their identity. It is every person’s responsibility to consume press reports responsibly and to analyze the statistics of supposed “growing” problems in their society as to avoid being caught in the fervor of “popular issues” so that they can help to steer their people from the dangers of moral panic and community sensitization.
References
Becker, Howard S. 1963 Outsiders: studies in the sociology of Deviance. New York: Free Press
Cohen, Stanley. 1967 “Mods, Rockers, and the Rest: Community reactions to Juvenile Delinquency.” Howard Journal, 12(2): 121-30
1972. Folk Devils and Moral Panics: The creation of the Mods and Rockers. London MacGibbon & Kee
